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Abstract
The relationship between profits and principles is rather diffuse. In the literature on business
ethics various alternative views exist. Some argue that ethical behaviour is the best long-term
business strategy for a company. Others suggest that a minimum ethical performance is
required to receive a ‘licence to operate’. The purpose of this article is to clarify these
different views. For this purpose, we develop an economic model that provides a uniform
framework for discussing these alternative views. The model is then used to analyse how
external factors, like the deregulation of the government, a change in consumer interests and
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Business ethics is a hot item. Although the term ‘Business ethics’ is not very popular, there is
an increasing attention to synonymous subjects, like sustainability management and corporate
social responsibility. Many companies are concerned about values like integrity and develop
ethical codes to foster responsible behaviour of their employees (Kaptein et al, 1999). Firms
find it increasingly important to behave like corporate citizens who take their responsibility in
solving large social-economic problems. Recent research shows that 78% of directors of
medium sized Dutch companies agreed that the company should contribute to solve social
problems (van Luijck, 2000).
Why this interest in business ethics and sustainability management? Running a
company in a financial successful way is already difficult enough. Why also consider difficult
issues like values, moral standards and the external effects of the business operation? With
tough competition, nobody wants to increase his burden by also considering ethical issues. So
why?
In order to shed light on these questions, we first review some trends that redefine
business today. Corporations discover that social responsibility pays off. This changes the
very nature of business and creates win-win situations. However, this is not the only
perspective from which the relationship between profits and ethics can be interpreted. In
particular, by investigating the Shell report ‘Profits and Principles’, section three develops the
thesis that this report holds four different perspectives on the relationship between profits and
principles. We present a mathematical formulation of these four relationships and analyse
which situation was most relevant for Shell in 1998. In the next section, we develop an
economic model that explains the trade-off between short-run profits and long-run reputation
effects and derive an expression for the optimal strategy of the firm. Section five uses this
model to analyse how external trends as described in section two impact strategic behaviour
of firms. The next section places some ethical notions and considers which perspective is
preferable from a moral point of view. From this moral point of view we look for some
implications for government policies. The last section summarizes the main results.
2 A growing attention to social responsibility of firms
There are several trends that explain the interest in corporate social responsibility. In contrast
to Jeurissen (2000), we distinguish between two types of trends. First, there are developments
that create a moral urgency for social responsibility of firms. These trends make clear that we
have a vacancy, a vacancy of taking responsibility for the adverse effects of the market
operation. However, these trends do not automatically ensure that companies will respond to
this challenge. Indeed, although some entrepreneurs are intrinsically concerned with social
goals and do the best they can, their hands are tied by the actions of their competitors.2
However, there are also some trends that provide economic incentives that stimulate firms
with no intrinsic stake in social goals are increasingly interested. These trends are described
in section 2.2.
2.1 Trends that create a vacant responsibility
From a moral point of view there are five reasons why business should take more social
responsibility for the effects of their operations. First, the deregulation of the government.
The seventies have shown that there are limits to the controlling and guiding power of the
government. She lacks the expertise to solve all social problems. Therefore, the government
seeks ways to involve business by deregulating certain tasks (Jeurissen, 2000) or by
privatisation of public companies. Deregulation is, however, only successful if companies
take responsibility for certain social targets, for example by sectoral agreements on how to
reduce the environmental effects of production. 
Second, the globalisation of the world economy intensifies ethical problems related to
cultural differences, for example with respect to the issue of human rights. Some countries
have autocratic regimes that repress democratic movements. Unfortunately, we lack a strong
international government that is able to prevent such situations. And the power of the national
government is restricted to its own territory. Therefore, in some cases only the international
company trading in such a country can possibly affect the political situation. Indeed, as
globalisation goes together with concentration of business by international mergers, very
large and powerful companies come to existence. Because of their power, they can exert a
substantial impact on local governments.  In short, power implies responsibility (Chryssides
and Kaler, 1993).
Third, in our knowledge economy economic success crucially depends on
technological innovations. New technologies confront firms that use or develop these
technologies, however, with new ethical issues, like the privacy of users of Internet or the
risks of new technologies like biogenetic food (Jeurissen, 2000). Recently, there is also a
debate about the threat from the combination of genetic manipulation, robotic technology and
nano technology on the independence of the human (Achterhuis, 2000). Will we still be
human beings if it becomes possible to implement chips to the consciousness of human
beings?
A fourth reason is the environmental concern. Because pollution has no price, firms
will tend to pollute more than is optimal from a social point of view. As the potential of the
government to put a price on pollution by, for example, fines or other penalties is limited,
there is a social need that companies take responsibility to develop production techniques that
save the environment.
Another threat for the sustainability of our way of life is the increasing economic
disparity all over the world. In the last two centuries the ratio between the average income per  See Landes (1998) and UNDP (1996).
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capita of the richest country (say Switserland) and the poorest country (say Ethiopia) has
increased from about 5:1 to 56:1.  The financial assets of the three richest persons exceed the
1
Gross National Product of the poorest 48 countries together (NRC, 1999). Such large income
disparities are probably not sustainable. It stimulates economic migration from South to
North and generates protests like those against the World Trade Organisation meeting in
Seattle.
2.2 Incentives for firms to fill this vacancy
The five trends mentioned above create a vacant responsibility. There is no automatic
insurance that firms will respond positively to this challenge. On the contrary, the
deregulation of the government and the growing internationalisation make government
controls less effective and reduce the probability to be caught when firms infringe the law.
Moreover, the growing dynamics and resulting uncertainty in the economy caused by the
globalization and the ICT revolution may shift the focus of firms from long-term strategies to
short-term strategies. As a result, reputation may become less important and this may reduce
the incentive to integrate social effects in the firm’s strategy. Also the increased competition
and higher flexibility of financial capital may force firms to pay more attention to profitability
at the costs of social goals like environment or employees rights. Hence, what makes us feel
comfortable that business will take up the challenge posed by the trends mentioned above?
The first incentive comes from direct stakeholders that can punish the firm when its
operations are not in line with the moral expectations of these stakeholders. Think of
consumers. Both the rise in welfare and in the skill level have made consumers more
interested in the world behind the products they buy. Especially in those issues that have a
direct impact on the consumer’s stake, health issues etc. But also in broader ethical issues.
Consumers have learned by experience that the society is a ‘closed system’. Automobile
exhaust does not disappear into the sky, it transforms the atmosphere and consequently our
climate. Moreover, as the public realises that the expertise and power of the government to
control these effects is limited, it is transferring its expectations of leadership in solving
social problems from the government to business. People judge corporations today also by
their social performance, not only by their financial performance. Firms who do not meet the
expectations of consumers, have a higher probability of losing their reputation with a negative
impact on market shares and profitability (McIntosh et al, 1998). 
The same holds for other direct stakeholders, like shareholders. Pension funds become
increasingly interested in responsible stock funds and financial banks introduce more and
more special funds that consider the ethical quality of the firms in which they invest. The new4
consumer’s conscience necessitates this attention to the ethical standing of a firm. If financial
institutions or private persons do not invest their money in companies with actual or potential
social and environmental liabilities, they reduce their risk of owning a company that suddenly
owes huge fines or settlements in damage suits (Daviss, 1999).
Also employees may impact the policy of their firm. With the tighter labour market,
employees are more particular about the company they want to work and social status is one
of the conditions that makes a company attractive.  Also social rest and prevention of moral
conflicts stimulate the company to consider the expectations of the employees.
A second trend that explains the interest of companies in social responsibility is the
increasing impact of indirect stakeholders like NGO’s. Activists are becoming increasingly
effective in forcing corporations to operate in line with their vision of social change. Some
large corporations are reacting pro-actively to this trend by seeking active cooperation with
NGOs. As a result, the role of activists is expanding from adversary to adviser.
The role of NGOs is strengthened by a third trend, that of an increasing role of the
media. Technological innovations like ICT makes the gathering of information much cheaper
and the organisation of networks easier. This strengthens the controlling function of the
media. If the media discovers that a company in some or another way misuses the trust given
by society, it will be very difficult to maintain its reputation. A Company’s ethical lapse can
now be flashed to news outlets and brokerage firms globally before a CEO can hurry back
from lunch. This makes companies more cautious and more inclined to take care that their
acts are in line with the expectations of the society.
A fourth trend that stimulates firms to pro-actively develop ethical strategies is that
the traditional moral authorities loose their impact. Moral standards are developed in the
public debate. And companies have a genuine interest to affect the way moral standards
develop by actively participating in this debate.
These trends suggest that ethics pays itself partly back. As people come to expect
corporations to take a larger social role, companies will develop a social identity that is as
important as brand identity. Indeed, if a company completely disregards ethics, the continuity
of the company is highly uncertain in the long run. However, sometimes doing what is ethical
will prove very costly to a company. This suggests that there may be decreasing returns to
considering social goals. If so, what is an optimal strategy for an individual firm? And how is
this strategy affected by such external changes as described above?
3 The Shell report: Four views on the relationship between profits and principles
As a starting point for our investigation of the relationship between profits and principles, we
take the Shell report of 1998  Profits and Principles - does there have to be a choice? In this
report Shell views its role in the challenge of the 21  century: how to attain a sustainable
ste The Shell Report 1998, page 46.
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 Or, as Daviss (1999) defines, the balance between cash flow and conscience.
3
 Shell, 1999, People, planet and profits. An act of commitment, The Shell Report 1999, page 7. 
4
 For example, if Shell employees all over world are paid an equal salary, employees in developing
5
countries will live on a ‘Island of wealth’. If, at the other hand, the salary is adjusted downwards to take account
of the local circumstances, the company can be accused of using double standards and exploitation of people
living in poor countries. Another dilemma concerns the human rights. Oil is sometimes found in countries
where the human rights situation is particular bad. How about operating in such a country? For a contractual
approach to these questions, see chapter 8 in Donaldson and Dunfee (1999).
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Figure 1 Investments in 1998 per region
economic development?  Three aspects of sustainability are distinguished: economic,
2
environmental and social sustainability. Companies are more and more judged on criteria
related to this so-called ‘triple bottom line’. The title of the Shell report of 1999 refers to
these three dimensions: profit, planet and people. Following the title of the 1998 Shell report
(Profits and principles: does there have to be a choice?), we take the environmental and social
dimension together under the heading ‘principles’ and investigate the balance between profits
and principles .
3
Shell is an interesting case indeed. First, Shell is a very large transnational company.
Shell operates in 129 countries and investments are allocated to all parts of the world.  This
4
means that Shell is confronted with all kinds of ethical questions related to the social-
economic and cultural differences
between various countries.  
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Second, the core business of
Shell is energy. The current
expectation is that the estimated
stocks of gas and oil will be depleted
in 100 respectively 80 years. As an
energy company, Shell has an
important responsibility with respect
to the future supply of energy.
Third, Shell fascinates
because of its recent conflicts with
the public opinion. Think of Nigeria
and the Brent Spar debacle. In both
cases, Shell did not succeed to
convince the public of the moral legitimacy of its strategy. Forced by consumer boycotts
during this crisis, Shell had to change its plans. From this time on, there has been a
remarkable change in the Shell strategy. From a rather closed and arrogant organisation, it
developed towards an open organisation willing to participate in a dialogue with NGO’s like6
Pax Christi (Gruiters, 2000). When we compare Shell with other companies, it seems that
Shell is in the frontline of business ethics. For example, in the  KPMG report Sustainability
Management (1999) nine of the eleven quotations refer to Shell.
As one of the frontrunners in business ethics, one would expect that Shell has a clear idea of
the relationship between profits and principles in its report Profits and Principles - does there
have to be a choice? However, careful reading of the report shows various statements on the
relationship between profits and ethics which reflect rather different positions. Shell seems to
be not aware of these differences. Our first purpose, therefore, is to clarify the relationship
between profits and ethics by developing an economic framework which distinguishes four
perspectives on the relationship between profits and principles and illustrate these
perspectives with some statements present in the Shell reports.
3.1 Win-win perspective
The first perspective is that there is no tension between profits and principles. Rather, profits
and principles reinforce each other. As Velasquez (1998) argues: ethical behaviour is the best
long-term business strategy for a company. Firms with the highest ethical standing will in the
long run also make the highest profits. Let us call this the win-win perspective. In a win-win
situation the business strategy is straight forward. Just be sure that you attain the highest
ethical standing, then you will be the most successful firm. And the other way around.
Mathematically, we define the win-win perspective as the maximalisation of a utility function
subject to a restriction in which profits depend positively on the level of principles. Note that
the win-win perspective does not require the exact specification of the utility function: if
principles have a positive impact on profits, it does not matter which goals enter the utility
function, because maximizing profits implies maximizing principles and vice versa. It only
considers the positive relationship between profits and principles in the restriction under
which the utility function is maximized. For the specification of the utility function there are
three possibilities: both profits (π) and principles (p) are positively valued U(π,p), only profits
are considered U(π) or only principles U(p).
Examples of statements in Shell reports that reflect a win-win perspective are given in
Box 1. The win-win situation is, of course, the most ideal situation. The task of the manager
is to turn as many problems into win-win situations as possible. Then there is no tension
between ‘sollen’ und ‘sein’. Business ethics boils down to choosing an effective business
strategy. The critical question is of course: does the win-win perspective capture all
situations? Are win-win strategies sufficient to realise sustainability in the long run? Is Shell
not too optimistic if it views the relationship between profits and principles as a win-win
situation? Are the risks involved well taken into account? Or is this optimistic view
motivated by the wish to avoid costly adjustments in the production and investments patterns,7
Box 1 The win-win perspective
max U  subject to π = f(p);  f’ > 0, with π: profits; p: principles 
Examples in Shell reports:
We believe fundamentally that there does not have to be a choice between profits and
principles in a responsibly run enterprise. (Shell Report 1998, page 3, 48)
New fast-forward advances in climate-friendly technologies could bring commercial
succes as well as climate benefits. (Cor Herkstöter, Reflections on Kyoto, 1998, page 3)
We believe that cutting corruption is essential and leads to greater equality, a happier
workplace, more efficient economies, rapidly increasing investment flows and the spread
of prosperity. (Shell Report 1998, page 20)
 
which would be necessary to prevent an environmental and energy crisis in the future?
In this respect, the future scenario’s of Shell are telling. For example, in the Shell report
Klimaatverandering: Hoe denkt Shell erover en wat doet Shell eraan? Shell develops two
energy scenario’s to scan the future. In the first scenario the share of energy in world
production falls by 1 percent per year. Moreover, after 2025 Shell expects a substantial
increase in the share of renewable energy sources, up to 50% in 2050, because innovation will
reduce the costs of these alternative sources whereas the increase in oil and gas prices will
further stimulate this substitution process. The second scenario assumes a more drastic
reduction in the consumption of energy, partly because of the information and communication
technology. In both scenario’s the expulsion of CO2 reaches a maximum between 2020-2030. 
This seems encouraging in two aspects. First, it seems that we will gain control on the
expulsion of CO2. Second, it is remarkable that both scenario’s come to the same conclusion.
This suggests limited risks involved.  However, one wonders when one compares with
scenario studies of, for example, the Central Planning Bureau (1992) that show a much larger
bandwidth, whether Shell is not too optimistic. Is Shell’s expectation to raise the share of
renewables in 2050 to 50% realistic or is it rather to be interpreted as a stretched target?
Another reason why the win-win perspective is insufficient to describe the whole
reality is that the optimal strategy implied in such a situation is reached when both profits and
principles are infinite. This can easily be seen from the mathematical formulation of the win-
win perspective. This suggests no scarcity and an abundance of free lunches. This is not
realistic. For example, a full guarantee of work safety by making the probability on business
accidents negligible can only be attained at a very high cost, which will not pay itself back.8
This suggests that the strategic decision problem of the firm can not be fully described by a
win-win perspective. Although dynamic external changes may temporarily create new win-
win situations, the steady state will generally not be characterized by this perspective.
3.2 Licence to operate perspective
Other statements in Shell reports show that Shell is aware of a certain tension between profits
and principles. Sometimes doing what is ethical will prove costly to a company. Ethical
behaviour is not always rewarded by a competitive advantage over companies that are not
ethical. Much depends on how consumers react and whether they are prepared to pay a higher
price for products that are produced in a responsible way. Neither is unethical behaviour
always punished. On the contrary, unethical behaviour sometimes pays off and the good guy
sometimes loses.
Given a negative relationship between principles and profitability, there are again
three possible specifications of the utility function: both profits and principles are positively
valued U(π,p), only profits are considered U(π) or only principles U(p). Let us first consider
the case in which the firm only attaches an intrinsic value to profits, in accordance with the
standard neoclassical model of the firm. In the neoclassical theory, the shareholder is the only
legitimate stakeholder. An exponent of this view is Friedman (1970). Friedman claims that
business corporations have only one social responsibility and that is to increase profits.
Friedman mentions five reasons. First, a corporation is an ‘artificial person’. Hence, it cannot
have moral responsibilities. Second, accepting social responsibilities means not having profit
as the only goal and this would imply that political mechanisms will interfere with economic
mechanisms. Third, Friedman endorses Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ argument that the
common good is best served by people pursuing their own self-interest. Fourth, managers are
agents of the shareholders in the business they work for. As such, they must only do what is
in the interest of these shareholders, which means making as much money as possible.
Friedman last argument is that the costs involved with taking social responsibility implies a
tax on shareholders because of lower dividends, or alternatively on customers because of
higher prices, or workers because of lower wages. And all this without being elected. 
If profits are negatively related to principles and profits is the only goal of the firm,
the optimal situation is reached where profits are at a maximum value and principles at a
minimum value. Statements in Shell reports indicate that this minimum value cannot be
freely chosen by the firm. Indeed, because of the countervailing power of consumers, NGOs
and the media, the company will have to take some social responsibility in order to get a
licence to operate. Let us call this the licence to operate perspective. In this perspective the
company maximizes profits under the condition that the level of principles is sufficient to
receive a licence to operate from the society. In some cases, this licence takes the form of a
real licence. For example, Shell needs a licence from the Dutch government for its gas9
Box 2 The licence to operate perspective
max U(π)  subject to: (1) π = f(p);  f’ < 0, with π: profits; p: principles 
(2) p ! p !, with p !: minimum required level of principles
Examples in Shell reports
To continue, it is essential to have endorsement from society - what some call a ‘licence to
operate’. (Shell Report 1998, page 18)
Business realises that its success depends on the approval of a broad range of people,
including those outside the organisation. (Shell Report 1998, page 29)
operations in the Dutch Waddenzee. In order to receive this licence, Shell must convince the
politicians that its operations will not harm the unique environment of the Waddenzee. More
general, the licence stands for the acceptation of Shell’s operations by all stakeholders who
can effectively impact the profitability of Shell. Also non-gouvernemental organisations and
the public at large have to be convinced of the moral legitimacy of Shells operations.
Otherwise, Shell risks a boycott from consumers, as the Brent Spar experience has shown.
This perspective is illustrated by various statements in the Shell reports. Box 2 gives some
examples.
Mathematically, the licence to operate perspective can be modelled by the
maximisation of profits subject to two restrictions. The first restriction specifies the negative
relationship between profits and principles. The second restriction requires that the level of
principles is at least as large as some minimum level of principles, required to obtain the
licence to operate. In contrast to the win-win perspective, this problem yields an unique
solution.
The licence to operate perspective assumes an active role of the stakeholders in
pursuing their interests and the interests of the society at large. If the government or citizens
fail to actively monitoring the activities of companies, the incentives for companies to
consider broader interests will weaken.
3.3 Acceptable profit perspective
In the licence to operate perspective, we assume that firms only strive at maximum profits.
Another situation arises if the utility function of the company only depends on principles.
Indeed, some companies like ASN bank are well known for their high ethical standards and
are intrinsically motivated to pursue these (Scott and Rothman, 1994). At a negative10
Box 3 The acceptable profit perspective
max U(p)  subject to: (1) π = f(p);  f’ < 0, with π: profits; p: principles 
(2) π ! π !, with π !: minimum required level of profits
Examples in Shell reports
Profits are essential to sustain a private business: without profits to re-invest, a business
ceases to exists and contributes nothing. They enable us to fulfil our social and
environmental obligations. (Shell Report 1998, page 9).
Profits give us the confidence to take a long-term view, and the capacity to avoid the
temptation of short-term wins, which could undermine our commitment to sustainable
development. (Shell Report 1998, page18)
Without profits, no private company can sustain principles (Shell Report 1998, page 19)
Acceptable is used intentionally, rather than ‘maximum’. This is because it reflects our
responsibility to make profits while taking full account of social and environmental
considerations. (Shell Report 1998, page10)
relationship between profits and principles, the firm will seek a combination of maximum
level of principles and a minimum level of profits. In that case, a firm will tend to be
restricted by the constraint that the firm must be sustainable from a financial perspective. This
happened, for example, with Consumer Unity. Founder Gibbons funded a local youth group
in Washington D.C. and promised each of the children who joined that if they stayed drug-
free, Consumer United would pay their way through college. Such largesse drew attention of
insurance industry regulators. They were not convinced that Gibbons was prudent enough
with policy-holders’ money and sought a court order declaring Consumers United insolvent.
In 1993, the company was shut down (Daviss, 1999). 
Firms that strive at maximum principles, will therefore be restricted by the condition
that the profitability is equal to some kind of minimum acceptable level of profits that is
necessary to guarantee the continuity of the firm. The real goal of the firm, however, is the
contribution of the firm to the interest of its stakeholders and the society at large. An
acceptable profitability is just a necessary condition to realise these goals. It generates the
freedom to act in a responsible way. Let us call this the acceptable profit perspective.
Examples of Shell statements reflecting this view are presented in Box 3.
Mathematically, the acceptable profit perspective can be defined as the maximisation
of the level of principles subject to two restrictions. The first restriction is the negative
relationship between profits and principles. The second restriction is that profitability must at
least be as high as some kind of minimum acceptable profitability required to assure the Max u(π,p) + λ(π-f(p)) gives:
6
(1) u’(π) + λ = 0 where u’(π) denotes the marginal utility from profits and λ the lagrange operator
(2) u’(p) - λ f’(p)=0 where u’(p) denotes the marginal utility from principles and f’(p) the marginal
impact of principles on profits.
Combination gives: u’(π) / u’(p) = - 1 / f’(p).
11
continuity of the company.
A crucial question is, of course, how high the minimum acceptable profitability is.
Shell states that dividends should grow at least as fast as inflation (Shell Report, 1998, page
10). This seems to be a modest and not very realistic target. A more realistic target is the
profitability of the competitors or the business at large. Indeed, if Shell wants to attract the
financial capital required to finance its investment plans, it cannot afford to stay behind its
competitors. Otherwise, the value of its stocks will start to decline and the probability of
successful emissions will fall. Another crucial question is, then, whether the minimum
acceptable profitability leaves some room for realising principles. If competitors take a strong
shareholder view, how much freedom is left to integrate social and ecological goals in the
business strategy?
3.4 Trade-off perspective
Both the licence to operate perspective and the acceptable profits perspective are extreme in
their specification of the utility function of companies. In the licence to operate perspective,
firms only strive at maximum profits, in the acceptable profits perspective principles are the
only goal of the firm. A logical and more realistic option is that a company attaches an
intrinsic value to both profits and principles. In that case, an optimal balance must be found
between profits and principles. Let us call this the trade-off perspective. Mathematically, the
business problem can now be defined as the maximalisation of a utility function in which,
again, both profits and principles are positively valued, but subject to a restriction in which
profits depend negatively  on the level of principles. Some examples of statements reported in
Shell reflecting this view are presented in Box 4.
In contrast to other perspectives, the trade-off perspective is an example of a standard
economic problem with a unique optimal solution (if certain conditions with respect to the
utility function and the restriction are met). The optimal utility is found where the ratio
between the marginal utility from profits and principles equals the absolute value of the
inverse of the marginal impact of principles on profits.  
612
Box 4 The trade-off perspective
max U(π,p)  subject to π = f(p);  f’ < 0, with π: profits; p: principles 
Examples in Shell reports:
Sustainable development is about balance and integration. Integrating the economic, social
and environmental aspects of everything we do. (Shell Report 1999, page 1)
Our primary responsibility has to be economic - wealth generation, meeting customer
needs, providing an acceptable return to investors, and contributing to overall economic
development. But there is also an inseparable responsibility to ensure that our business are
run in a way that is ethically acceptable to the rest of the world and in line with our own
values. (Shell Report 1998, page 3)
When we compare the trade-off perspective with the other perspectives, one further remark is
in order. This concerns the possibility that firms attaching an intrinsic value to both value
profits and principles are still restricted by the restrictions of a minimum level of principles
required by society or an acceptable level of profits required by the capital market. In that
case, the behaviour of the firm is seemingly not distinguishable from that of firms that operate
in a licence to operate perspective respectively acceptable profit restriction. However, if the
restrictions are relaxed for one or another reason, such a firm might react in another way than
firms that only attach an intrinsic value to profits or principles (see section 5 for examples). In
order to distinguish between these cases, we shall denote these specific cases of a trade-off
perspective as principle-restricted respectively profit-restricted trade-off perspectives.
3.5 An encompassing framework
Figure 2 presents an encompassing framework for the four perspectives on the relationship
between profits and principles. The vertical axes reflects the profit level, the horizontal axes
the level of principles. The curve connecting the points A-B-C-D reflects the restriction on
the choice of the company. Let us call this the profit-principle restriction curve, or more
shortly, the PPR curve. The PPR curve assumes that a company without any principles suffers
losses and has no future. For this part of the PPR curve, it is assumed that raising the ethical
standard of the company also improves its profitability. Ethical aspects of firm behaviour for
which this win-win relationship with profits hold are, for example, integrity of employees and
the prevention of corruption and bribery. Companies that are able to successfully realise these
working patterns, for example by ethical codes, reduce the transaction costs and raise the13
Figure 2 An encompassing framework
transparency of their organisation which allows a more efficient allocation of means within
the company.
The PPR-curve assumes, however, that the marginal profits from raising the ethical
standing of the firm declines with the ethical level of the firm. For example, a further
reduction in the probability of an environmental accident in the chemical industry becomes
progressively costlier if the current safety standards are higher. At a certain point (point A in
Figure 2), the marginal return of an investment in safety standards becomes negative. This
marks the borderline of the win-win perspective. Companies operating in a win-win
perspective, will end in this point if they go for maximum profits. This once again makes
clear that the win-win situation is generally no representative characterisation of the situation
of the firm: a win-win situation provides incentives to raise the level of principles up to a
point were the positive relationship
between profits and principles ends.
There are three reasons why
firms may choose a point further at the
right than point A.  First, the level of
principles at point A may be
insufficient to receive a licence to
operate. Suppose, for example, that p !
denotes the minimum level of
principles to attain such a licence. That
means, only points at the right of point
C belong to the part of the PPR curve
that the firm can choose. If profits is
the only goal of the firm, as in the licence to operate perspective, the firm will choose point
C.
Second, if firms only strive at the maximization of principles, they will raise the level
of principles to the point where the level of profitability is restricted by the minimum
profitability (! π) required to assure the financial basis of the firm. In Figure 2 this is reflected
by point D.
Third,  if the company attaches an intrinsic value both to profits and to principles, the
point of tangency between the iso-utility curve (which reflects equal levels of utility U) and
the PPR-curve will ly at the right of point A. In figure 2, this is reflected by point B. Note that
at the minimally required level of principles p !, the level of principles in point B is not
sufficient to receive a licence to operate. Hence, in this case, the firm will be forced to chose
for point C and operate in a principle-restricted trade-off perspective.14
Figure 3 Return on capital
3.6 Shell’s position in 1998
An intriguing question is in which position Shell operated in 1998? The statements of Shell in
the Shell Report 1998 indicate that they felt that all perspectives were relevant for them. How
is this possible? To answer this question, we must realise that Figure 2 depicts a very specific
situation. The optimal choice depends on the position of all curves. For example, if the
minimum acceptable profitability lies at the profit level in point A, the firm is left no other
choice than maximizing its profits, even if the goal of the firm is to maximize principles. If,
moreover, the minimum level of principles matches the level of principles in point A, the
firm is also restricted from this point of
view. In such a case, both the win-win
perspective (namely, the left side of point
A), the profit restriction perspective and
the licence to operate perspective may be
relevant.
The Shell report suggest that this
was the situation Shell perceived in
1998. Indeed, in 1998 Shell was in a
difficult position. The return on average
capital employed (ROACE) was 3%,
much lower than the level expected in
1997 and also much lower than the
ROACE of Exxon, Chevron and Texaco, some important competitors of Shell. Accordingly,
the market value of Shell’s stocks declined by 24 billion dollars, whereas for BP the market
value increased by 24%. At the same time, Shell had committed itself to a more responsible
strategy in reaction to the Brent Spar debacle and the ongoing criticism on Shell’s operations
in Nigeria. The combination of financial pressure from competitors at the one hand and the
public opinion on the other hand may have inspired the statement of Moody Stuart in the
Shell report of 1999: ‘There is no alternative’. It just reflects a situation in which one feels
bound by external restrictions.
4 Modelling the strategic choice between profits and principles: short term and
long term considerations
Until now we have taken a static view on the relationship between profits and principles. In
this section we extend the framework and also include intertemporal considerations. For that
purpose, we develop an economic model that describes strategic behaviour of firms with
respect to the trade off between profits and principles.15
4.1 Model assumptions
Suppose there are two situations: a state in which the firm has a good reputation and a state in
which the firm has a bad reputation. Firms with a low ethical standard can initially have a
good reputation, but have a higher risk of losing this position and enter the state with a bad
reputation. For example, even companies with low safety standards can have a long period of
no accidents happening. Even if some accidents occur, they are sometimes able to hide these
accidents from the public. But, of course, the probability of an accident will be higher and so
will be the chance of being exposed to the public opinion. Firms can reduce this probability
by raising the ethical standards, but then they incur some additional operation costs. This can
be modelled by the following utility equation:
(1) ρ e =  α ln π (d)+ (1-α) ln d + f (d) (e  - e )   "lnπ /"d < 0; "f/ "d < 0;  gg 1 b g g 1
"("lnπ /"d)/"d<0 ; "("f/ "d)/"d>0 g1
"("lnπ /"d)/"π =0 gg
where e  and e  denote the discounted intertemporal utility of the firm in a state of a good gb
reputation respectively bad reputation, ρ the rate of time preference, π  the short run profits in g
a state of a good reputation, d the level of principles and f  the probability of moving from a 1
state of a good reputation to a state of a bad reputation. The first two terms reflect the short
term interests of the firm, which is modelled as a logarithmic utility function with iso-utility
curves that are concave in short term profits and the level of principles. It is assumed that (in
the short run) profits depend negatively on the level of principles, because of the additional
costs involved by maintaining a high level of principles. The second order derivative is
assumed to be negative. That means: the negative impact on short term profits rises with the
level of principles. Indeed, if the firm raises its safety standards, the costs will generally
increase progressively and, hence, the profits will decline increasingly. The probability to lose
the good reputation depends negatively on the level of principles. However, the second order
derivative of principles is assumed to be positive. That means: the marginal impact of the
level of principles on the probability to lose the good reputation decreases with the level of
principles. The second order derivative of the logarithm of profits is probably negligible and
therefore assumed to be zero: if profits increase, the marginal impact of principles on the
logarithm of profits remains constant. This also implies that a rise in the level in principles
will have a similar negative impact on the logarithm of profits in the state of a good
reputation as in the state of a bad reputation ("lnπ /" d - "lnπ /" d = 0). Finally, if α<1 the firm bg
attaches an intrinsic value to the level of profits. If α=1, the level of principles has only an
extrinsic value.
The firm’s utility in the state of a bad reputation (b) is defined as: Define f  = ρ + f  + f . The first order derivates are: "f/ "d = [("f/ "d)(ρ+f ) - ("f/ "d)
7
41 2 3 1 2 2
f] / ( f 4 )= ( "f/ "d)(1-f )/ f  - ("f/ "d) f /f <0; "f/ "ρ = -f /f <0. 11 3 4 2 3 4 3 3 4
2
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(2) ρ e =  α ln π (d)+ (1-α) ln d + f (d) (e  - e )  "lnπ /"d < 0; "f/ "d > 0; π <π bb 2 g b b 2 b g
"("lnπ /"d)/"d<0 ; "("f/ "d)/"d<0 b2
f (d) < f (d) 21
It is assumed that in the state of a bad reputation short run profits are lower than in the state
of the good reputation, for example because of a loss in output. The firm has a probability f2
of restoring its reputation. This probability depends positively on its principles. The second
order derivative is assumed to be negative: if the level of principles increases, the probability
of restoring the reputation rises degressively. We assume that f  will be lower than f . Indeed, 21
once a good reputation is lost, it often takes a long time before the damage is taken away.
Bovenberg (2000) even argues that firms that have lost their good reputation, will not be able
to reenter a state of good reputation.
4.2 Link with the four perspectives
Rewriting equation (2) gives:
(3) e  = (α ln π (d)+ (1-α) ln d + f (d) e ) / (ρ + f (d)) bb 2 g 2
Substitution in equation (1) gives:
(4) e  = {α ln π (d)+ (1-α) ln d + f (d,ρ) α (ln π (d)- ln π (d))} / ρ  gg 3 b g
where f (d,ρ) equals f (d) / (ρ + f (d) + f (d)). f  reflects the average probability of being in a 31 1 2 3
state with a bad reputation. It can be shown that both "f/ "d and "f/ "ρ are negative whereas 33
"("f/ "d)/"d is positive.  Raising the level of principles lowers the probability of being in a 3
7
state of bad reputation because the probability of moving from a state of a good reputation to
a state of a bad reputation declines, whereas the probability of moving the other way around
increases. If the level of principles rises further, the marginal impact of principles on the
probability of being in a state of a bad reputation weakens, however. If the rate of time
preference increases, the firm cares less about the future. Consequently, the firm will focus
more on short-run profits whereas the weight of the reduction in profits caused by a loss of
the good reputation declines.
At this point of the presentation of the model, we are ready to point at the link
between the graphs presented in section 3 and the intertemporal model presented in this
section. For that purpose, we rewrite equation (4) in the form of a utility function and a profit-17
principle-restriction:
(5) e  = {α Π (d)+ (1-α) ln d } / ρ Intertemporal utility  gg
(6) Π  = ln π (d)+ f (d,ρ) (ln π (d)- ln π (d)) Profit-principle  restriction gg 3 b g
Note that the profit-principle restriction exhibits the characteristics assumed in section 3. If
the level of principles is low, the negative impact of principles on profits is relatively low,
whereas the negative impact on the probability to be in a state with a bad reputation is
relatively high. Hence, the total impact of principles on intertemporal profits is likely to be
positive and the firm operates in a win-win perspective. If the level of principles increases,
the negative impact of principles on profits increases ("("π /"d)/"d<0), whereas the negative g
impact on the probability of being in a state with a bad reputation increases ("("f/ "d)/"d>0). 3
Hence, at some turning point, a maximum value of Π will be reached, from where a further
increase in the level of principles results in a decline of Π. If α equals 1 so that the firm only
attaches an intrinsic value to profits, firms will only chose for a higher value of principles
than implied by the turning point if they are forced to do so because of an effective minimum
principle restriction. In this case the firm will operate in a licence-to-operate perspective. If
α=0, firms will only consider the level of principles as an argument in the utility function and
therefore chose a level of profits that is equal to the minimally level required by the capital
market for continuing the firm. This is the acceptable profit perspective. Finally, if 0<α<1, the
company attaches an intrinsic value to both profits and principles and will chose an optimal
level of principles that is derived in the next subsection, provided that both the principle and
profit restriction are not binding.
4.3 Derivation of the optimal level of principles
In this subsection we derive the optimal level for a representative firm starting with a good
reputation. This firm sets d in order to maximize e . The first order condition for maximum g
utility (e ) can be written as: g
(7) " e /  " d = [α ("lnπ /" d) + (1-α) / d + ("f/ "d) α {ln π - ln π } +  gg 3 b g
f  α {"lnπ /" d) - "lnπ /" d)}] / ρ = 0 3b g
 
As explained above, the last term is assumed to be zero. This means we can simplify equation
(7) to:
(8) - "lnπ /" d = ((1-α)/α) / d +("f/ "d) {ln π (d)- ln π (d)} g3 b g The marginal impact of the rate of time preferences on "f/ "d can be defined as
8
3
"("f/ "d)/"ρ=("f/ "d)(1-2f )/f  + ("f/ "d) 2f /f , which is positive if f >(ρ+f )/(1-2 "f/ "d), which is plausible 31 3 4 2 3 4 1 2 2
22
because of the asymmetry between losing and restoring reputation.
18
Equation (8) expresses that at the optimal level of principles the marginal reduction in short
run profits equals the sum of the marginal intrinsic value of principles plus the marginal
returns from a reduction in the probability of being in a state of bad reputation. 
Taking the total differentiation of equation (8) gives (again assuming that
"("lnπ/"d)/"π = 0):
(9) p  #d = p  (#lnπ - #lnπ ) + p  #α  + #("lnπ /" d) + p  #("f/ "d) 1 2 b g 3 g 4 3
with p  = - "("lnπ /"d)/"d) + ((1-α)/α)/d  - "("f/ "d)/"d){ln π -ln π }>0 1g 3 b g
2
p =    "f/ "d < 0  23
p  = -(1/α)/ d  <  0 3
2
p =  { l n  π - ln π }< 0 4b g
Note that the sign of p  is strictly ambiguous. The first two terms are both positive. The third 1
term can be defined as:
(10) "("f/ "d)/"d = [(ρ+f )("("f/ "d)/"d -f "("f/ "d)/"d - 2("f/ "d+"f/ "d)]/f 32 1 1 2 1 2 4
3 
which is strictly ambiguous but is most likely to be positive as the first two terms are both
positive and dominate the third ambiguous term (which is zero if "f/ "d=-"f/ "d). Therefore, 12
we feel confident that the term as a whole is positive. As -p  is equal to the second order 1
derivative of e  with respect to d, this is a condition for a maximum solution for e . g g
From equation (9) it follows that the level of principles chosen by a representative
firm in a state of good reputation is higher if:
S the difference in the logarithm of profits in a state of a good reputation (π ) and profits g
in a state of a bad reputation (π ) is higher; b
S the firm attaches more intrinsic value to principles, i.e. if α is lower;
S the impact of principles on current profits ("lnπ /" d) is less negative; g
S the negative impact of principles on the average probability of being in state of a bad
reputation ("f/ "d) is larger, for example because the rate of time preference is lower 3
8
or because of a higher impact of the level of principles on the flow rates between the
states of good and bad reputation.
Likewise, we can derive the optimal level of principles for firms with a bad reputation. First Here again the first two terms are positive, whereas the third term is positive provided that
9
"("f/ "d)/"d = [(ρ+f )("("f/ "d)/"d -f "("f/ "d)/"d - 2("f/ "d+"f/ "d)]/f is negative, which is most likely since 51 2 2 1 1 2 4
3 
the first two terms are both negative and probably dominate the third ambiguous term (which is zero if "f/ "d=- 1
"f/ "d).             2
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rewrite equation (1) into:
(11) e  = (α ln π (d)+ (1-α) ln d + f (d) e ) / (ρ + f (d)) gg 1 b 1
Substitution in equation (2) gives:
(12) e  = {α ln π (d)+ (1-α) ln d + f (d,ρ) α (ln π (d)- ln π (d))} / ρ  bb 5 g b
where f (d,ρ) equals f (d) / (ρ + f (d) + f (d)). The first-order condition for an optimal level of 52 1 2
principles reads:
(13) - "lnπ /" d = ((1-α)/α) / d +("f/ "d) {ln π (d)- ln π (d)} b5 g b
Total differentiation equals:
(14) p ' #d  = p ' (#lnπ - #lnπ ) + p  #α  + #("lnπ /" d) + p ' #("f/ "d) 1 2 g b 3 b 4 3
with p ' = - "("lnπ /"d)/"d) + ((1-α)/α)/d  - "("f/ "d)/"d){ln π -ln π }>0 1b 5 g b
29
p'  =    "f/ "d > 0  25
p'  =  { l n  π - ln π }> 0 4g b
From equation (14) similar conclusions follow as for equation (9). In particular, the level of
principles chosen by a representative firm in a state with a bad reputation is higher if:
S the difference in the logarithm of profits in a state of a good reputation (π ) and profits g
in a state of a bad reputation (π ) is higher; b
S the firm attaches more intrinsic value to principles, i.e. if α is lower;
S the impact of principles on current profits ("lnπ /" d) is less negative; b
S the positive impact of principles on the average probability of being in state of a good
reputation ("f/ "d) is larger. 5
4.4 Steady state
Once the optimal choices of firms in a state of a good respectively bad reputation are
determined, we can derive the share of firms with a good reputation respectively bad
reputation. In particular, in the steady state the flow of firms from a state of a good reputation20
to a state of a bad reputation is equal to the flow of firms from a state of a bad reputation to a
state of a good reputation, i.e.
(15) f (d ) n  = f (d ) (n - n ) 1g g 2b g
where d  (d ) denotes the optimal level of principles of companies in a good (respectively gb
bad) state, n  the number of companies in a good state and n the total number of companies. g
Rewriting for the share of companies in a good state gives:
(16) n  / n = 1 / (f (d ) / f (d ) + 1) g1 g 2 b
Taking the total differentiation yields:
(17) #(n  / n)  = - p  ("f/ "d) #d  + p  (f (d ) / f (d )) ("f/ "d) #d  g5 1 g 5 1 g 2 b 2 b
with p  = 1 / [f (d )(f (d ) / f (d ) + 1) ] > 0. From equation (17) it can easily be seen that the 52 b 1 g 2 b
2
share of firms operating in the state of a good reputation depends positively on the level of
principles chosen by firms both in the state of a good reputation and in the state of a bad
reputation.
5 Interpreting the impact of the various trends on strategic choice of companies
Section 3 and 4 sketch a graphical and mathematical framework which allows us to
investigate the determinants of strategic choices of firms with respect to the balance between
profits and principles. In this section, we use this framework to analyse the impact of various
trends on strategic firm behaviour. First, we study three cases in which the growing dynamics
in the economy tend to shift the balance between profits and principles in favour of profits.
Then we look at three other trends that stimulate an inverse movement.
5.1 Decreasing impact of the government
As described in section 2, one of the causes that explains the increased interest in the social
responsibility of firms is the diminished role of the government. New growing dynamics in
the economy because of the increasing speed of technological innovations and the
internationalisation of the economy reduce the effective power of the government to regulate
and control the effects of the production processes of corporations. Indeed, the past two
decades has shown that there are limits to the capability of the government to solve social
problems. As a result, Western governments have withdrawn from several areas of the
economy by deregulating the economy and allowing more competition in sectors like health21
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care and social security which were highly regulated in the seventies.
The deregulation in the last decade may have shifted the balance between profits and
principles in favour of profits. In particular, by making controls less stringent, the minimum
level of principles required to receive a licence to operate may have decreased from p !1 to p !2
and in some cases to p !3. This may increase the significancy of moral values because the way
firms respond to this vacant responsibility depend on the location of their iso-utility function
including their intrinsic interest in principles. In case of a small shift from p !1 to p !2, firms that
strive to profit maximisation (U1) will fully accommodate to the new lower minimum level
of principles and maintain their licence to operate perspective on the relationship between
profits and principles. Firms that attach some intrinsic value to principles (U2) and find their
optimal level of principles in between p !1 and p !2, will not fully accommodate their level of
principles to the new minimum. Other firms with a high intrinsic value to principles (U3) will
not change their balance between
profits and principles at all.
In case of a large shift from p !1
to p !3 firms that only attach extrinsic
value to principles will also shift away
from a licence to operate perspective
and choose the level of principles that
maximizes profits. At this point, a
further reduction in the level of
principles will decrease profits which
is not in the interest of the firm. 
This analysis also illustrates
that the recent interest of companies in
social responsibility is not necessarily good news from a social point of view. Indeed, insofar
this interest is a response to the decreasing ability of the government to extort a certain level
of principles, the rising interest of companies actually goes together with a reduction of the
level of principles itself.
Of course, in some cases we also see a movement towards more stringent government
regulations. If a particular economic sector causes a lot of environmental damage, the
government can raise the ecological requirements for that sector. If the minimum level of
principles shifts from p !1 to p !4, the profitability of the firms falls below the minimum
acceptable profitability rendering these activities unmarketable anymore. For this reason, the
government may sometimes refrain from raising its standards or postpone the commencing
date, but in other cases the evidence of the environmental damage of a sector may be so
evident, that the government is left no other choice.
Finally, it should be noted that the deregulation of the government may also have had
an inverse effect by activating the civil society in their direct control of the operations of22
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firms. Moreover, if information is hardly verifiable, deregulation may improve the realisation
of social goals if it stimulates firms to commit themselves to contribute to these goals
(Bovenberg, 2000).
Another remark concerns the privatisation of collective firms, which is often
combined with an increase in regulations in order to secure that the privatised firm produces
the public services demanded by the government. This change can be interpreted as a
weakening of the weight of principles in the utility function of the company (since it is
privatised) combined with the introduction of an external restriction on the minimum level of
principles required by the government. The effect on the balance between profits and
principles is uncertain. For example, if the iso-utility curve shifts from U2 to U1, whereas the
government introduces a licence to operate restriction at p !1, the level of principles will
increase. But if the licence to operate restriction is set at p !2, the level of principles will
decrease.
   
5.2 Increased mobility of capital
Another implication of the increased globalization and transparency of the economy is an
increased mobility of capital. This also impacts the balance between profits and principles. In
particular, it might raise the minimum level of profitability required by the capital market.
Firms that cannot come on terms with the profitability level that the market demands will face
difficulties in attracting new capital to finance their investments and become an object for
take over by more profitable firms.
The rise in the minimum
required profitability will raise the share
of companies that are restricted by this
condition. In particular, an increase in
the minimum required profitability from
π !1 to π !2 (see Figure 5) will reduce the
level of principles of firms with iso-
utility curve that imply an optimal level
of principles beyond p !1. As a result,
some firms will shift from a unrestricted
to a profit restricted trade-off
perspective (like, for example, the firm
with iso-utility curve U1). In a fully
competitive capital market, the
minimum level of profitability will be equal to π !3 allowing no freedom at all to raise the level
of principles beyond will p !2. Managers prefering a higher level than p !2 face a risk that the
financial basis of the company collapses.23
Figure 6 Shift in profit-principle restriction
5.3 Greater dynamics in the economy
Another aspect of the growing dynamics of the economy as a result of, for example, the high
speed of technological inventions, is that it is more difficult for economic agents to assess
future developments in the market. Because of the high uncertainty, economic agents will be
inclined to employ a higher rate of time preference. As a result of the associated shorter time
horizons and increased ‘short-term’ thinking, the discounted benefits of maintaining a high
reputation decline.
As shown in section 4 a higher rate of time preference will reduce the negative impact
of the level of principles on the probability of being in a state of a bad reputation. Whereas
the negative direct impact of the costs
of maintaining a higher level of
principles on profits remains
unchanged, the positive marginal
impact of principles on profits by
reducing the probability of a loss of
reputation is less valued because of the
shorter time horizon. As a result, the
optimal level of principles falls.
Graphically, this is illustrated by Figure
6.  
The rise in the rate of time
preference shifts the PPR curve to the
left. Accordingly, the optimal level of principles falls, both for firms that attach an intrinsic
value to principles (whose iso-utility curve shifts from U1 to U1') and for firms who
extrinsically value principles (with iso-utility curve U2).
5.4 Shifting consumer preferences
Whereas the previous sections showed some trends that cause the balance between profits and
principles to shift in favour of profits, the next three sections analyses some trends with
inverse implications.
In this subsection, we first consider the impact of a higher preference of consumers for
social goals. There are several ways of interpreting this trend in the context of the framework
developed in section 4. First, a higher preference for the social quality of the goods delivered
by the company may reduce the negative impact of principles on short run profit. In
particular, although raising the ethical quality of the product generates additional production
costs, the change in consumers’ preferences implies that the demand for this type of goods
will increase. As a result, the firm can set a higher price for its product or increase its sales.24
Hence, the negative impact of the level of principles on short run profits will decline.
Another mechanism through which the shift in consumer preferences affects the
balance between profits and principles is by lowering the profit level in the state of a bad
reputation. Upon discovery of unethical aspects firms are sometimes confronted with a strong
consumer boycott of their products. The strength of the boycott depends on the attitude of
consumers. If a lot of consumers are sensitive to the social effects of the operations of the
firm, the discovery of the lapse may invoke a mass response of the public with dramatic
consequences for the firm with, as possible outcome, bankruptcy. If, on the other hand, only a
small group of activistic consumers are prepared to pay the price of boycotting the firm, the
expected decline in profits upon discovery of ethical lapse will be small and firms will be
tempted to chose a lower level of principles.
A shift in consumer preferences can also affect the balance between profits and
principles through a change in the flow probabilities between the state of a good reputation
and a state of a bad reputation. For example, if consumers have a relatively short memory, it
will be easy for a firm to restore its reputation. For example, when the public found out that
Ford had deliberately chosen for a dangerous position of the gas tank in the Ford Pinto
causing the death of many motorists in the seventies, the American consumer was furious.
Ford reacted by finishing the production of the Pinto. Fortunately for Ford this accident
caused no permanent damage of its reputation, apparently because of the short memory of the
public (NRC, 2000). This may also explain why Ford is currently again involved in a safety
scandal focussing on the motor-tires used for the Ford Explorer, which have caused several
accidents and casualties.
Graphically, all these impacts of more social awareness of consumers on the balance
between profits and principles can be illustrated by a shift of the PPR curve to the right. The
impact on the optimal level of principles is inverse to the changes depicted in Figure 6.
5.5 Shifting preferences of shareholders, managers and employees
The growing social awareness of the public will also change the attitudes of shareholders,
managers and employees. The public’s new conscience reflects itself in a rise of socially
conscious investing. Indeed, stock funds that subscribe social aware investments have seen an
enormous growth in the last ten years. Also managers are convinced that social responsibility
is a legitimate purpose of the company. For them a concern with the ethics of their business is
part of a now well established and seemingly inevitable process of professionalization
(Chryssides and Kaler, 1993). The motivation is almost certainly a desire for the high social
esteem which this social concern brings. Finally, the growing individualization and increased
skill level make employees more independent of the company. In the management literature it
is widely accepted by now that if an organisation respects the individual employee, they will
respond with a loyalty and a commitment to the organisation which generate increases in25
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productivity.
The shift in preferences of shareholders, managers and employees has similar effects
on the balance between profits and principles as the shift in consumer preferences. First, these
shifts may reduce the negative impact of principles on short run profit. For example, if a
higher level of principles increases the productivity of employees, the negative impact of
principles on short run profits will decrease and even change sign in some cases. Second,
these shifts may also lower the profit level in the state of a bad reputation. In particular, if
shareholders are more sensitive to the ethical standing of the firm, discovery of unethical
aspects may have dramatic effects on the stock value of the firm with similar consequences
on the continuity of the firm as a consumer boycott. Third, the change in attitude will also
change the flow probabilities between the state of a good reputation and a state of a bad
reputation for similar reasons as mentioned in the previous subsection.
However, there is one additional mechanism through which shifts in the preferences
of shareholders and managers, and to a
lesser extent, of employees will affect
the balance between profits and
principles. That is: it might also change
the intrinsic value of principles in the
utility function of this company. As
shown in section 4, this has an
unambiguous positive impact on the
optimal level of principles.
Graphically, the change in intrinsic
value of principles can be illustrated by
Figure 7.
A shift of the iso-utility curve
from U1 (with no intrinsic value of
principles) to U2 increases the optimal level of principles provided that both points are not
restricted by the minimum level of principles restriction. If not (as for example if p !=p ! ), we 1
will see no effect. In that case, only a drastic increase in the intrinsic value of principles in the
utility function from U1 to U3 will cause an increase in the level of principles and a shift
from the licence to operate perspective to an unrestricted trade-off perspective. If the iso-
utility curve shifts to U4, the company will enter in an acceptable profitability perspective.
Finally, we note that public corporations are more likely to be bound to the profit
restriction than closely held companies like family owned companies. As family companies
are not directly subject to the market forces on the capital market, their minimum required
profitability will generally be lower than that of public corporations. Hence, there is more
freedom for family owned firms to live up with their principles. This illustrates that there are
several ethical aspects of turning a family company into a public corporation. Of course, a26
complicating factor is that principles are less well defined and measured than profits,
especially if a company holds a lot of different principles. A family company therefore also
runs a higher risk of moral hazard, not being disciplined by the market.
5.6 NGO’s and the increased role of the media
Our final example of applying our framework for interpreting the impact of trends on the
balance between profits and principles is the influence of the NGOs and the increased role of
the media. I take both together, because both are strongly intertwined. The success of the
NGOs depends largely on the ability of the media to expose their findings to the public,
whereas the media depends strongly on the expertise of NGOs for discovering cases that are
ethically unsound, although individual journalists also become more and more sophisticated.
The NGOs and media impact the balance between profits and principles mainly by
raising the probability to lose a good reputation if the firm’s level of principles is low and to
raise the probability of regaining a good reputation if the firm seriously adapts its principles if
the firm is found shirking.
Another effect of the rise of NGOs and the increased role of the media is that
companies have an incentive to start a dialogue. Indeed, by seeking cooperation with NGO’s
these organisations may become less critical once they get convinced of the good intentions
of a firm. For example, after Shell started a dialogue with NGOs like Amnesty International
and Pax Christi, these organisations have been more inclined to apprehend some of the
human right problems Shell faces in developing countries. The effect of this cooperation may
be that corporations benefit from the expertise of NGOs and are therefore able to raise their
level of principles in a cost effective way. This may reduce the negative impact of principles
on short run profits.
Both effects will shift the PPR curve to the right and redefine the balance between
profits and principles in favour of the latter (see Figure 6).
6 An ethical valuation
Until now we have only looked at the relationship between profits and principles from an
economic point of view. Indeed, our main interest in this article is to clear up the relationship
between profits and principles by developing an economic framework to interpret the shifting
balance between the two in response to some exogenous trends. In this section we also take a
brief look to the ethical valuation of the relationship between profits and principles. The
question we are interested in is which of the perspectives derived in section three is
responsible from an ethical point of view.27
Win-win perspective
First, let us consider the  win-win perspective. In our framework, the win-win perspective
only specifies the restriction under which the utility of the firm is maximized. It leaves open
the goals of the firm: if principles have a positive impact on profits, it does not matter which
goals enter the goal function, because maximizing profits implies maximizing principles and
vice versa. As the goal function remains unspecified, it is hard to evaluate this perspective
from an ethical point of view. The most relevant question here is therefore: is the  set of
measures that are in line with the win-win perspective sufficient to attain social goals? If the
economic incentives for firms to take account of social goals are not strong enough,
ecological and social sustainability will not be realized. For that reason, the win-win
perspective is not considered the only relevant perspective.
Licence to operate perspective
If the relationship between profits and principles is negative, the goal function must be
specified in order to determine the solution. First, consider the licence to operate perspective.
In that case, a company only attaches an intrinsic value to profits. Principles are only
considered if other parties in the market force the firm to take account of them. The
advantage of this perspective is that the role division is clear. Firms have to take
responsibility for sustainability from an economic point of view, the other parties are
responsible for setting minimum standards of principles that secure social and ecological
sustainability. If these other parties are successful in setting a high standard of minimally
required principles, principles will really matter and unconditionally be applied. Indeed, one
of the main functions of NGOs and the media is that they transform the relative small power
of individual persons into a strong interest party at a relatively low cost of a small
contribution. However, it remains uncertain that this countervailing power is strong enough to
reverse the unfavourable social and ecological trends outlined in section two. If these external
parties fail somehow, the company will reduce its level of principles and restrict its social and
ecological efforts to the level where profits are maximized. In a consequentialistic approach
like utilitarianism this outcome is acceptable provided that the firm is fully transparent in its
social effects. Indeed, if the society does not ask for social or environmental goals and is not
motivated to force firms in that direction, why should firms do so? Also in the contract
approach of Donaldson (1982) and Donaldson and Dunfee (1999), the firm will not be
morally obliged to take social responsibility beyond the point where profits are maximized in
such a case.
In other approaches, like for example ecological ethics, this is not acceptable. In that
case, environmental sustainability should have an intrinsic value of itself. That means:
nonhuman parts of the environment deserve to be preserved for their own sake, regardless of
its usefulness for humans. Every life should be respected. Also from the point of view of
virtue ethics such a respectful attitude toward nature is required, based on the notion that each28
living seeks its own good. This implies that all living have an inherent good of their own, that
should be respected. This view is quite radical and highly controversial. It seems to be subject
to the criticism of the naturalistic fallacy, that derives a moral statement from factual
situations. However, facts never imply moral standards. From the fact that a certain animal,
plant or lake exists, we cannot derive the moral obligation that it should exist (Velasquez,
1998). Another criticism on ecological ethics is that it is very difficult to value nature
intrinsically. Every valuation is a human valuation and reflects human interests in nature.
Therefore, you cannot value nature regardless of human interests, because all valuation
incorporates preferences of humans (Manenschijn, 1988).
Another approach bases environmental sustainability on the rights ethics. Right ethics
stress that social and ecological sustainability is something to which each human has a right.
Note the difference with the ecological ethics. Here we talk about human rights, not of a right
of the environment itself. Why do human beings have this right? The reason is that social and
ecological rights are essential to the fulfilment of our human capacities as rational and free
beings. They override other rights like the property right which is behind the right of
shareholders on economic sustainability. Even if the civil society is not able to effectuate
social or environmental rights by successfully setting certain minimum standards that
guarantee social or environmental sustainability, this does not dismiss companies from their
obligation to consider these rights.
Acceptable profit and trade-off perspective
Reversal of the social and ecological trends outlined in section 2 is more guaranteed if
companies attach intrinsic values to principles and act as corporate citizens. In that case, there
remain two perspectives, the trade-off perspective and the acceptable profit perspective. In
both cases companies attach intrinsic value to principles. The difference is that in the
acceptable profit perspective profits are only seen as an instrument to guarantee the continuity
of the firm, whereas in the trade-off perspective the company also attaches an intrinsic value
to profits. How do we value this difference from an ethical point of view? From a
consequentialistic point a view, there is no a priori preference for one of these perspectives. It
depends on the social welfare of high economic growth versus the social welfare of a high
level of principles. From a non-consequentialistic view like the rights ethics, there neither
seems to be a preference for the trade-off perspective or the acceptable profit perspective.
Both the property rights of shareholders and the (prima facie) rights of other stakeholders are
considered in both perspectives. In the trade-off perspective directly by the arguments in the
utility function, in the acceptable profit perspective indirectly by the minimum acceptable
profit restriction. Only if the latter restriction is not effective in assuring the economic
continuity of the firm, the trade-off perspective is more preferable than the acceptable profit
perspective. 
We therefore conclude that the trade-off perspective is preferable to the licence to29
operate perspective and the acceptable profit perspective if  the level of principles required to
obtain a licence to operate is too low to realise social and ecological sustainability and if the
minimum level of profits is too low to guarantee economic sustainability.
7 Some implications for government policy
In section 2 we have sketched several trends that create a vacant responsibility for firms to
consider the social effects of their operations. We have also shown how other trends provide
incentives for firms to take up this challenge. What if these incentives are insufficient to
motivate firms to take up the role of corporate citizens and if they chose a level of principles
that makes it likely that the unfavourable social and environmental developments, sketched in
section 2, will continue? Are there, in that case, possibilities for the government to enforce
these incentives?
The analysis in section 2 suggests that the role of the government is limited. Indeed,
with the growing dynamics and complexity of the economy, it becomes more difficult for the
government to regulate business operations by laws and other directrixes. This makes it
difficult for the government to affect the balance between profits and principles by raising the
minimum level of principles that is required to obtain a licence to operate. Still, the
government has some other possibilities to influence the balance between profits and
principles. First, the government can raise the intrinsic value of principles of firms by raising
the awareness of the importance of social responsibility. For example, by creating a platform
that provides information on codes developed by international corporations and international
organisations like the OECD. The government can also reduce the negative impact of
principles on short run profits by subsidizing actions of firms that improve the social and
environmental effects of their operations or raise the costs if found shirking by putting higher
fines on operations that damage the social and ecological environment. However, like legal
measures, financial incentives by subsidies or fines are only effective if the government can
control the social and environmental effects of the firms’ operations. This requires a good
accounting system of social and environmental effects of the operation of companies. Insofar
such an accounting system is lacking, providing financial incentives faces the risk of an
inefficient allocation of government means. Insofar the quality of social and environmental
reports improves, this generates more possibilities for government regulations that internalize
the social effects of operations and provide a level playing field for the firms that are subject
to these regulations. 
Another way of stimulating companies to take social responsibility for the social and
ecological effects of their operations is by strengthening the countervailing power of
consumers, NGOs and the general public. This shifts the profit-principle restriction to the
right and enlarges the relevance of the win-win perspective. For example, by providing
information on the effects of certain consumption goods or by tax exemptions for the returns30
of financial assets invested in funds that are certificated as ethical responsible, consumers will
be prepared to pay a higher price for social responsibility. The position of NGOs could also
be improved by providing financial support to the operations of these organisations.
However, the government should not push this approach to far. This would turn these
organisations into government offices. Moreover, by providing financial incentives for
consumers or their representative organisations, the intrinsic motivation of consumers and
NGOs may diminish. Indeed, as Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) show, extrinsic motivations
may crowd out intrinsic motivations and the net effect may even be negative. Another way of
improving the quality of the impact of NGOs is to raise the accountability of these
organisations. Indeed, as these organisations are less disciplined by the market, they should
meet certain standards of transparency in order to secure the quality of their operations.
Alternatively, government policies may affect the balance between profits and
principles through the effect on the acceptable profit constraint. A traditional task of the
government is to stimulate competition between firms by an active antitrust policy and other
kinds of market regulation that raise the transparency of the market and reduce transactions
costs. The welfare effects of competition are well known: it raises the efficiency of the
allocation process by forcing firms to set price as low as possible and to raise the efficiency of
the production process. However, raising the competition on the capital market, for example
by improving its transparency, may induce an upward shift in the acceptable profits constraint
for an individual firm. In case of perfect competition, a firm cannot afford making additional
costs because of social responsibility unless these costs can be shifted forward into higher
prices (Homann and Blome-Drees, 1992). For firms operating in a trade-off or acceptable
profit perspective, this may induce a shift in the balance between profits and principles in
favour of profits. On the other hand, firms operating in the win-win perspective may be
stimulated to speed up the process of raising profits by increasing principles. As the win-win
perspective is only a temporary state, it is plausible that only a small minority of firms will
raise its principles in reaction to more severe competition. This points at a trade-off between
the (macro) economic advantages and the social and environment disadvantages of more
competition on the capital market.
8 Summary
The retreat of the government, the globalization and growing dynamics of the economy create
a vacant responsibility for firms to consider the social and environment effects of their
operations. Other trends, like a higher environmental and social concern of consumers and an
increased role of NGOs and the media, foster that companies have an incentive to fill this
vacant responsibility. This paper analyses how these trends affect the balance between profits
and principles in strategic firm behaviour.
For this purpose, section 3 investigates some Shell reports and looks for statements31
about how Shell views the relationship between profits and principles. Shell is an interesting
case. After its clash with German customers and NGOs in the Brent Spar case, it changed its
strategy in order to internalize the effects on its operations on the countervailing powers in
the society. A study of the Shell reports shows, however, that Shell has no clear idea of the
relationship between profits and principles. Section 3 clarifies this relation by distinguishing
between four different perspectives which can all be found in the Shell reports. First, some
statements argue that more principles generate higher profits. This win-win perspective
implies that no choice between profits and principles is required: maximizing profits implies
maximizing principles and vice versa. Other statements show, however, that there can be a
tension between profits and principles. In that case, there are three possibilities. If the goal of
the firm is profit maximisation, the optimal balance between profits and principles is found
where profits are at a maximal value and principles at a minimal value. This minimum value
of principles can not be freely chosen, but is set by the society from which the company needs
a licence to operate. This is the licence to operate perspective. If the goal of the company is to
maximize principles, the principles are set at a level where the company is confronted with
the restriction that the profitability must reach an acceptable level, that is required by the
capital market to assure the financial continuity. This is the acceptable profits perspective.
Finally, if the company attaches an intrinsic value to both profits and principles, the optimal
balance between profits and principles is there where the ratio between the marginal utility of
profits and principles equals the absolute value of the inverse of the marginal impact of
principles on profits.
Section four extends the framework by modelling the impact of principles on the
trade-off between short run profits and long-term reputation effects. From the mathematical
model we derive that the optimal balance between profits and principles shifts in favour of
principles if the firm attaches a higher intrinsic value to principles; if the impact of principles
on short run profits is less negative; if the reputation effect of principles is higher; if the time
horizon of the company is higher and if the loss in profits upon losing a good reputation is
higher.
Section five uses the framework developed in section 3 and 4 to analyse how the
trends described in section two affect the balance between profits and principles. This section
illustrates how firms react in a different way to the various trends. For example, a reduction in
the level of principles minimally required by society to obtain a licence to operate will be
fully accommodated by a firm that strives at profit maximisation, whereas firms attaching an
intrinsic value to both profits and principles may not be affected. Furthermore, it is argued
that certain trends affect the balance between profits and principles through various
mechanisms. For example, a shift in consumer preferences may influence the firm behaviour
either by changing the direct costs of principles, by lowering the profit level if the firm loses
its good reputation or by affecting the probability to lose a good reputation or restoring the
good reputation if found shirking. 32
Section six evaluates the various perspectives from an ethical point of view. The win-
win perspective would be the most attractive one provided that the set of measures that are in
line with this perspective is sufficient to attain social and environmental sustainability. If this
is not the case, the trade-off perspective is valued as the most ideal perspective: the licence to
operate perspective is rejected if the level of principles required to get a licence to operate
insufficiently promotes social and environmental sustainability. The acceptable profit
perspective is rejected if the minimum required level of profits is too low to secure economic
sustainability.
Section seven derives some policy conclusions. It is argued that the government can
provide financial incentives in the form of subsidies and fines on both producers and
countervailing powers. However, the government cannot push this strategy too far, either
because of insufficient information required for an efficient allocation of these subsidies and
because of the danger that financial incentives will weaken intrinsic motivations. Another
implication for government policy is that the government task to stimulate competition by
anti-trust policy and raising the transparency of capital markets, may have a negative impact
on social and environmental goals.33
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